

Mohist Traces in the Early *Chunqiu fanlu* Chapters

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Introduction

Introductions to Chinese Philosophy generally state that in Early Han times the dominant ideology of Han-Confucianism was a syncretistic product of Legalist, Mohist, Daoist, Cosmologist and other traditions. Yet, whereas Legalism, Daoism and cosmological thought are still discernible in distinct groups and texts in Early Han, Mohism seems to have entirely merged with Confucianism and lost any social or institutional identity. This merging did not happen all at once, Mohist influence can already be found in Warring States Ruist texts such as the *Mengzi* and the *Xunzi*. The identification of Mohist elements in Early Han Confucian texts therefore raises the methodological issue of whether these elements have not much earlier already “changed side” and have become an integral part of the Confucian school. The following paper will therefore only focus on Mohist traces in what can be recognized as innovative parts in Early Han Confucian texts that clearly go beyond Warring States Ruist discourses. Yet, a second methodological problem underlying this approach is how in general innovations may be identified as distinct elements in Early Han Confucian texts because many of the Early Han Confucian texts are in content and form not comparable to earlier Confucian texts. Therefore, we must restrict our search to those few texts which continue earlier text genres and topics because only these allow us, on a comparative basis, to clearly discern Han innovative text elements. However, not many Early Han Confucian texts lie in a continuous line with Zhou Confucian traditions. Three exegetical traditions might probably provide the only lines of thematic and genre continuity of Confucian texts leading from the Zhou to the Han dynasty.

Some of the *Liji* chapters can be interpreted as a continuation of earlier interpretative traditions of ritual. A number of *Liji* chapters refer to *Yili* chapters, and although a dating of the *Liji* chapters proves difficult we can expect different layers of continuous exegetical development reaching up to Early Han as I have shown elsewhere.¹

A second continuous tradition of Confucian text exegesis is reflected in the tomb manuscripts “Wuxing” and “Kongzi *Shi lun*” which have allowed us new insights into Late Zhou *Shi* exegesis and teaching practice.² Apart from the *Hanshi waizhuan*, however, which is not so much

1 I have suggested such a development using the example of *Liji* chapters related to the “Sangfu” chapter of the *Yili*. Cf. Joachim Gentz, „Geschichtete Ritendiskurse. Eine Archäologie“, *Monumenta Serica* 56 (2008): 97–115. See also my “‘Living in the Same House’: Ritual Principles in Early Chinese Reflections on Mourning Garments”, in *Ritual Dynamics and the Science of Ritual*, vol. I, ed. Axel Michaels, section 2, *Ritual Discourse, Ritual Performance in China and Japan*, ed. Gil Raz, Katja Triplett and Lucia Dolce, (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010), 377–402.

2 Cf. the detailed analysis of Martin Kern, “Speaking of Poetry: Pattern and Argument in the ‘Kongzi shi lun’”, paper given on the conference “Literary Forms of Arguments”, held at Oxford, 16–18 Sept. 2009, to be published in J. Gentz and Dirk Meyer (eds.), *Literary Forms of Argument* (Seattle: Washington University, forthcoming).

an exegetical work but rather a practical handbook of application,³ we do not have any work from Early Han reflecting innovation in Han dynasty *Shi* exegesis.

A third tradition, and probably the most important for Early Han, is the *Chunqiu* tradition, of which we are happy enough to have the *Chunqiu fanlu*, a compilation of which at least the first 17 chapters seem to reflect Early Han scholarship on the *Chunqiu* which very closely follows the *Chunqiu* exegesis of the *Gongyang zhuan*.⁴ Another early Han work on the *Chunqiu* is the *Chunqiu jueyu*, also ascribed to Dong Zhongshu, which resembles the *Hanshi waizhuan* in its applicative function and, equally, is not primarily an exegetical work on the *Chunqiu* text itself but a handbook for juridical court cases.⁵ The *Chunqiu fanlu* contains the earliest transmitted advancement of the *Gongyang* tradition after the compilation of the *Gongyang zhuan*. The assumption that the book was authored by Dong Zhongshu has been called into question time and again since the first doubts expressed in the *Chongwen zongmu* 崇文總目 edited by Wang Yaochen 王堯臣 and others in 1034.⁶ Most scholars nowadays regard the book as a compilation of different layers of very heterogeneous material from Han and probably even post-Han scholarship from different fields of expertise.⁷ Throughout the many attempts at analyzing different strata within the *Chunqiu fanlu* most authors agree that the first 17 chapters, which end with a postface (Yu xu 俞序) and might thus be regarded as a book within the book, represent the earliest and most likely authentic part of the whole compilation. In contrast to the rest of the text, these chapters consist of mere *Chunqiu* exegesis and constitute a further step in the development of *Gongyang* scholar-

3 Cf. James R. Hightower, *Han Shib Wai Chuan: Han Ying's Illustrations of the Didactic Application of the Classic of Songs* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1952), 2–3.

4 For a detailed analysis of these chapters, see Gentz, “Vom Fall zum Sinn: Die *Chunqiu*-Exegese in den ersten 17 Kapiteln des *Chunqiu fanlu*” (Unpubl. MA thesis, Heidelberg, 1995), reworked into part three of my *Das Gongyang zhuan, Auslegung und Kanonisierung der Frühlings- und Herbstannalen* (Chunqiu) (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2001), 406–539.

5 Cf. Benjamin E. Wallacker, „The Spring and Autumn Annals as a Source of Law in Han China,“ in: *Journal of Chinese Studies* 2.1 (April 1985): 59–72; Gary Arbuckle, „Former Han Legal Philosophy and the Gongyang Zhuan,“ in: *B.C. Asian Review* 1 (September 1987): 1–25; Sarah Queen, *From Chronicle to Canon: The Hermeneutics of the Spring and Autumn, according to Tung Chung-shu* (New York: Cambridge University, 1996), 127–181; and Gentz, *Gongyang zhuan*, 452–454.

6 For the history of the debate about the authenticity of the *Chunqiu fanlu* and their own arguments on authenticity and dating see Arbuckle, “Restoring Dong Zhongshu (BCE 195–115): An Experiment in Historical and Philosophical Reconstruction” (Ph.D. thesis, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1991; UMI 1993), 316 ff.; cf. also his paper “The works of Dong Zhongshu and the text traditionally and incorrectly titled Luxuriant Dew of the Annals (Chunqiu fanlu). With particular attention to Section A (Chapters 1–17) of the Luxuriant Dew of the Annals” (last revised September 2004), online at: www.sagesource.net/dong/works_part_A.html (22.2.08), and Queen, *From Chronicle to Canon*, 45–49; see also Gentz, *Gongyang zhuan*, 406–408. Michael Loewe is about to publish a book length study on Dong Zhongshu and the *Chunqiu fanlu* which will also include a detailed presentation of the history of this discussion.

7 Cf. Arbuckle and Queen, as in fn. 6. Göran Malmqvist told me on May 2nd 2005 in Uppsala that on the basis of linguistic evidence he is convinced that the *Chunqiu fanlu* as a whole is a compilation, which has to be dated to Wei/Jin times. Michael Nyland told me on the same day that she is also convinced of such a late dating. Michael Loewe in his forthcoming book will discuss the main arguments of dating.

ship on the *Chunqiu*, which was decisive for the canonization of the *Chunqiu* in Early Han.⁸ The extraordinary status of the *Chunqiu* was only possible on the ground of this further exegetical development, which can be ascribed to Huwu sheng 胡毋生,⁹ Dong Zhongshu, or their disciples, all of whom may be the authors of these chapters.¹⁰

The main hypothesis of the following article is that the Han exegetical development which is clearly discernible in these early chapters of the *Chunqiu fanlu* can in all its main innovative moves be traced back to the earlier Mohist tradition. I will argue that all the important new exegetical elements which raised the *Chunqiu* to the position of the leading classic of Early Han¹¹ have a Mohist tinge. For this purpose I will first point out the main innovations which we find in the *Chunqiu fanlu* vis à vis the pre-Han *Gongyang zhuan*. I will then try to explain these innovations by relating them to Mohist traditions.

The 17 *Chunqiu* exegetical chapters of the *Chunqiu fanlu* consist of three different parts which have to be regarded separately since they follow different methodologies and aims and also reflect different aspects of the Mohist doctrine.

In chapters 1–9, we find an exegesis which tries to supplement shortcomings of the *Gongyang* commentary and tries to solve contradictions in it by differentiating certain exegetical rules and by adding new ones. A number of new topics are introduced and a new exegetical language and methodology is used which is neatly related to the Mohist context of logical discourse. Whereas the exegesis in the first five chapters focuses on this sort of highly developed hermeneutics applied to individual passages, it becomes much more oriented toward specific topics in chapters 6 through 9, which lead to the purely topic-oriented chapters 10–12.

We find a very different *Chunqiu* exegesis in this exegetical unit of chapters 10–12, the most consequent form of which is found in chapter 12, where ten guiding points (*shi zhi* 十指) for the reading of the *Chunqiu* are given (see translation below). In contrast to the first nine chapters, which try to supplement and differentiate the exegesis of the *Gongyang zhuan*, these chapters try to define a set of central principles of the *Chunqiu*. These guiding principles are not based anymore on the exegesis of specific text passages. Independent from the casuistic exegetical work, they are detached from the concrete text of the *Gongyang zhuan* and may thus be read as a set of basic statements, which can be employed as political guidelines. The chapters thus appear less as an

8 The exegetical stage of these chapters roughly corresponds to the exegetical stage of the *Guliang* tradition which we find reflected in 13 passages quoting *Guliang* interpretations of the *Chunqiu* in the *Xinyu* of Lu Jia dated around 196 BC; see Gentz, “From Casuistic Exegesis to Discursive Guidelines. Early Han *Chunqiu*-exegesis of Lu Jia (*Guliang*) and Dong Zhongshu (*Gongyang*),” unpubl. paper presented at the Second International Convention of Asian Studies (ICAS) in Berlin, 9 August 2001.

9 Huwu sheng (also Humu sheng 胡毋生 or Huwu Zidu 胡毋子都, fl. 2nd cent. BC) was a *Gongyang* scholar appointed at the same time as Dong Zhongshu under the emperors Jing and Wu. He was at the time probably more influential than Dong (whose outstanding position in Early Han history of thought was mainly constructed in Ban Gu’s biographical representation of Dong in the *Hanshu*): his interpretation was followed in the states of Qi and Lu whereas Dong’s was only followed in Zhao. Cf. his biography in *Shiji* 史記 (Zhonghua edition) 121.3118, right after that of Dong.

10 Arbuckle speculates that the material might come from the school of Huwu sheng; see Arbuckle, “Restoring Dong Zhongshu,” 457–459 and “The works of Dong Zhongshu. . .”

11 Cf. Hiraoka Takeo 平岡武夫, *Keisho no seiritsu: tenkateki sekaikan* 經書の成立: 天下の世界觀, (orig. Osaka: Zenkoku, 1946; repr. Tōkyō: Sōbunsha, 1983), 23.

attempt to define a theory of *Chunqiu* exegesis than a theory of the *Chunqiu* itself. The new and central question in these chapters is not whether the guiding lines defined in these chapters may be found in the *Chunqiu*, as in the previous chapters 1–9, where this had to be proven case by case by concrete exegesis. Now the central question is rather whether *these* are the central and most important guiding lines or not (as opposed to other possible sets of main guiding lines). They thus reflect something like the formal dogmatization of *Chunqiu* exegesis. The basis of this question is the proposal of a fixed arsenal of exegetical principles of the *Chunqiu* which are all heavily Mohist in character as I will demonstrate below.

Chapters 13–16 contain mixed material which shows no exegetical innovation and looks like a heterogeneous collection of fragmentary material, a type of text we often find at the end of compilations like the *Chunqiu fanlu*.

As its title “Yu xu” (俞序) indicates, chapter 17 seems to be the postface of the *Chunqiu* exegetical part of the *Chunqiu fanlu* written probably by someone with the family name Yu 俞. This postface reflects a further step of *Chunqiu* exegesis, which seems to respond to what we found in chapters 10–12 and opposes the strong Mohist voice of these chapters with a Confucian last word. Like a counter-blast against the concept of the *Chunqiu* as a book containing political guiding principles for technical use in government practice, chapter 17 focuses on traditional Confucian virtues like humanity (*ren* 仁) and forbearance (*shu* 恕). According to the author of this postface the central concern of the *Chunqiu* lies in the transmission of these virtues, which are taken to be the virtues of the sage emperors Yao and Shun and not of principles for the pragmatic elimination of harm (*chu buo* 出禍) in a political sphere as we find it in chapters 10–12. The exegetical question thus has taken a counter step. The question posed here is not which guiding principles are most important in the *Chunqiu* (chapters. 10–12) but whether in the *Chunqiu* guiding principles are important at all. It is the fundamental question of the value and the benefit of the *Chunqiu*, which is posed in this chapter. It is answered with a clear “reformist”¹² voice in favour of traditional Confucian virtues and against any utilitarian or pragmatic and technical appropriation of the *Chunqiu*.

We thus find three entirely different exegetical positions within the first 17 chapters of the *Chunqiu fanlu*, which as a collection of early *Chunqiu* exegetical material seem to reflect different stages of *Chunqiu* exegesis and which also reflect different grades of Mohist thought.¹³

Intending to investigate Mohist traces in these early chapters I will only analyse chapters 1–9, and chapter 12 which seems to be the finalized text of a scholarly effort of which chapters 10 and 11 appear as unfinished drafts.

Two different focuses will be necessary in both parts, chapters 1–9 and chapter 12, to analytically cover the whole field of interpretative innovations: a focus on the new topics of the *Chunqiu* explanations of the *Chunqiu fanlu* and a focus on new theories about the *Chunqiu* as provided by these early chapters of the *Chunqiu fanlu*.

12 See for the analytic differentiation between “modernists” and “reformists” in early Han, Michael Loewe, “The Former Han Dynasty,” in *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 1: *The Ch’in and Han Empires, 221 BC–AD 220*, ed. Denis Twitchett and M. Loewe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1986), 104–110.

13 This is the short version of a more detailed short introduction to the early chapters of the *Chunqiu fanlu* in my “Language of Heaven, Exegetical Skepticism and the Reinsertion of Religious Concepts in the *Gongyang* Tradition”, in *Early Chinese Religion*, Vol. 1: *Shang Through Han (1250 BC–220 AD)*, ed. John Lagerwey and Marc Kalinowski (Handbuch der Orientalistik, 4, 21, 1, 1. Leiden: Brill, 2008): 813–838, 823–828.

Regarding the topics (and many of them are definable and subsumable through specific expressions) we may differentiate three main relationships between *Gongyang*-topics and *Chunqiu fanlu*-topics: 1. Many of the topics overlap. Both texts discuss, and refer to, matters of the wise kings of antiquity (*xian wang* 先王, *xian sheng* 先聖), to the regulation of disorder (*zhi luan* 治亂), to the proper way (*dao* 道), to humanity and righteousness (*ren yi* 仁義), to practical ethics, to correct hierarchies and differentiation of tasks and duties, or to the important role of the ruler. 2. Certain topics which were not popular in Early Han and in Mohism were either discussed in a selective frame or reinterpreted. Ritual (*li* 禮), for example, regarded very critical by Mohists, is in the *Chunqiu fanlu* not discussed in regard to practical details and formal definitions as we find it in many *Gongyang* passages. It is rather interpreted in relation to intention (*zhi* 志) and its practical value, both topics of major Mohist interest. 3. There is an introduction of a number of new topics which had been conspicuously absent from the *Gongyang zhu* discourse but are part of the Mohist discourse such as human intentions (*zhi* 志), natural calamities and anomalies (*zaiyi* 災異) or matters related to Heaven (*tian* 天).

As to theory we find recourse to Mohist analytical models and the usage of Mohist terminology. With the application of Mohist theory a new exegetical methodology is also taken over which reflects Mohist values. A theory that aims at explaining exegetical moves along general and publicly accessible interpretative guidelines and thus moves away from the authority of cautiously retained expert knowledge always carries political values. The egalitarian idea expressed in the new exegetical methodology of the *Chunqiu fanlu* seems to reflect Mohist values and political ideals.

The analysis is therefore divided into the two parts *topics* and *theory* and will at the end reflect upon the value implications of the new exegetical methodology which follows from Mohist explanative theories.

Chunqiu Fanlu Chapters 1–9

Topics

36 main themes are discussed in chapters 1–9 of the *Chunqiu fanlu* that become topological in character through the coherent usage of specific terms, oppositional pairs and v-o-expressions in discussions connected to them:¹⁴

1. Antiquity (*xi* 昔, *gu* 古) and the way of the ancient kings (*wangdao* 王道) as major point of orientation
2. Relationship between ancient and contemporary times (*gu* 古 – *jin* 今)
3. Hierarchical distinction of social and political positions (*deng zun bei* 等尊卑, *bie gui jian* 別貴賤, *cha xian buxiao* 察賢不肖)
4. Differentiation of tasks and duties between superiors and inferiors (*shang* 上 – *xia* 下)
5. Six Confucian Classics (*liu yi* 六藝)
6. Difference between root and branches (*ben* 本 – *mo* 末)
7. Removing of doubts (*bie xianyi* 別嫌疑)
8. Rectification of disordered times (*zhi luan shi* 正亂時)
9. Difference between the constant and the changeable (*chang* 常 – *bian* 變, *jing* 經 – *bian* 變)

14 For a detailed analysis of these topics with translations of all the related passages, see Gentz, “Vom Fall zum Sinn,” 50–63.

10. Analysis of gain and loss, rise and fall, success and failure, winning and losing (*de* 得 – *shi* 失, *cun* 存 – *wang* 亡, *cheng* 成 – *bai* 敗)
11. Confucian virtues (*ren* 仁, *yi* 義, *li* 禮, *zhi* 智, *xin* 信, *xiao* 孝, *zhong* 忠)
12. Anxiety, caution (*shen* 慎)
13. Sorrow, care (*you* 憂)
14. Kingly transformative teaching (*jiaohua* 教化)
15. Anomalies as Heavenly warnings (*zaiyi* 災異)
16. Critique of any evil right at its beginning, nipping of any evil in the bud
17. Inference of many things from little information (*tui* 推)
18. Different regulation of identical patterns (*yi zhi er tong li* 異治而同理)
19. Relation between precise and general (*xian* 鮮 – *lie* 略)
20. Differentiation between near – far, inner – outer, Middle states – YiDi ‘barbarians’ (*jin/qin* 近 / 親 – *yuan/shu* 遠 / 疏, *nei* 內 – *wai* 外, *Zhongguo* 中國 – *YiDi* 夷狄)
21. Comprehension of everything (*ju bei* 具備)
22. Regicides and downfall of states in the Chunqiu period (*shi jun* 弑君, *guo wang* 國亡)
23. Heaven (*tian* 天) as main point of orientation
24. Beginning, origin, one (*yuan* 元, *yi* 一, *shi* 始, *duan* 端)
25. Relation between Heaven and man (king in between) (*tian* 天 – *ren* 人)
26. Estimation of intention (*qin zhi* 賁志)
27. Human heart, humanity (*ren xin* 仁心, *ren* 仁)
28. Care for the people (*ai ren* 愛人, *zhong ren* 重人)
29. Differentiation of able and unable people (*xian* 賢 – *buxiao* 不肖)
30. Critique of luxury and profusion
31. Difference between the simple and the refined (*zhi* 質 – *wen* 文) with preference for the simple
32. Detestation of war
33. Differentiation of categories (*bie lei* 別類)
34. Differentiation between right and wrong (*shi* 是 – *fei* 非)
35. Change of institutions (*gai zhi* 改制)
36. Setting up of the way of the New King (*li xin wang zhi dao* 立新王之道)

Apart from the last two which seem to be typical Qin/Han-time topics all topics could be located in the field of Mohist philosophy. Not one of these topics contradicts or is absent in Mohist teachings. Topics 1–22 are clear continuations of the earlier *Gongyang* discourses. Topics 23–34, however, are newly introduced and have not been part of the earlier *Gongyang* tradition. Yet, all these topics (23–34) are important and central topics of the Mohist tradition. Besides the way of the ancient kings, Heaven is newly introduced as the major standard and point of orientation in *Chunqiu* exegesis:

《春秋》之法，以人隨君，以君隨天。

One of the exemplary standards of the *Chunqiu* is that people follow their ruler and the ruler follows Heaven.¹⁵

Heaven defines the formal beginning of the *Chunqiu* with the beginning of the calendrical year (*tian duan* 天端) and with it the origin (*yuan* 元) and unity (*yi* 一) of the whole moral and historical order

15 Cf. Su Yu 蘇輿, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng* 春秋繁露義證 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1992), 31.

with which the *Chunqiu* starts (*shi* 始) at the same time. In rectifying the beginning (*zheng shi* 正始) the *Chunqiu* thus follows and implements the pattern of Heaven.¹⁶ Following this Heavenly starting point (*tian duan* 天端), as the commencement of a new period (*shi* 時), to ascend the throne the king (as positioned between Heaven and humans) is able to rectify the political realm and to exert his transformative teaching (*jiaohua* 教化). Graham has pointed out that “throughout the *Canons* and *Explanations* the Mohist recognises no points which are not the starting-points (*duan* 端) of measurements (A 61), no moments (*wu chiu* 無久, ‘durationless’) which are not the commencements (*shi* 始) of periods (A 44).”¹⁷ These new *Chunqiu* exegetical concepts thus seem to follow central Mohist notions. Other newly introduced concepts which we do not find in the earlier *Gongyang* exegesis such as the estimation of intention, loving of the people, emphasis on ability or critique of luxury and profusion might be found in other earlier Confucian discourses. However, they are all more associated with Mohist teaching than with Confucian teaching. Other topics such as detestation of war and preference of the simple (and preference of *ren*-humanity over *li*-ritual)¹⁸ seem to be even more clearly influenced by Mohist thought. Topics 33 and 34 refer to specific methodologies which are identified in the *Gongyang* exegesis of the *Chunqiu* by the *Chunqiu fanlu* author(s). They lead over to what I will now try to analyse in the second part on theory.

Theory

In the first 9 chapters of the *Chunqiu fanlu* a theoretical language is used in which we find new technical concepts stemming from the context of speculative-logical discourse. Abstract principles of exegesis are formulated on an exegetical meta-level which is based more on an interest in analytical topics than on a specific exegetical interest in single text passages. For the first time we find explicit instructions which tell the readers how to read the text of the *Chunqiu*. General reading principles are given and illustrated by examples, which demonstrate step by step which principles have to be applied in what way to certain passages in the text. These demonstrations exhibit a highly sophisticated argumentative exegesis operating with proofs that are articulated into as many as six steps. The exegesis is thus much less based on exegetical authority than in the *Gongyang zhuan* and is much more “democratic” in the sense that exegetical operation rules are made transparent and thereby available to the readers themselves. Graham notes that the Mohist tradition “has developed the moral teaching of Mo-tzu into an elaborate ethical system justified by no authority but by the procedures of disputation.”¹⁹ This egalitarian “democratic” attitude can be found in a number of pre-Han philosophical texts. Dirk Meyer in his study on the Guodian corpus has used the formulation “argument-based” texts to distinguish them from “authority-based” texts. He found that, surprisingly, it is exactly the argumentative texts in the Guodian library which have not been transmitted to us.²⁰ Likewise the school of Mozi, although his text has been transmitted, has ceased to exist and the text has been neglected until it became interesting through the encounter with the European culture which held argumentative texts in very high esteem.

16 Cf. Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 68–70.

17 Cf. A.C. Graham, *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science* (Hongkong: Chinese University, 1978, Rpt. 2003), 58.

18 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 27, 55.

19 Cf. Graham, *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science*, 33.

20 Dirk Meyer, “Meaning-construction in Warring-States Philosophical Discourse: A Discussion of the Paleographic Materials from Tomb Guodian One” (unpubl. PhD thesis, Leiden, 2008), 294–320, esp. 317–318.

In the following I will give an example of this highly sophisticated argumentative exegesis in the *Chunqiu fanlu* to compare it then with principles which we find formulated in the *Mozzi*.

《春秋》論十二世之事，人道浹而王道備。法布二百四十二年之中，相耿左右，以成文采。其居參錯，非襲古也。是故論《春秋》者，合而通之，緣而求之，五其比，偶其類，覽其緒，屠其贅，是以人道浹而王法立。[...] 故能以比貫類、以辨付贅者，大得之矣。

In the *Chunqiu's* discussion of the affairs of 12 periods [of rulers] the way of the humans is pervaded and the way of the kings is comprehended. Its exemplary cases (*fa*) are spread over a period of 242 years, complement each other and thereby form a complex composition. The interlocked structure which lies therein does not follow [the form of the events of] ancient times. Therefore those who discuss the *Chunqiu* have to combine [the interlocked parts] and make them consistent, retrace them and search [for analogous cases], group their parallel examples, pair their kindred cases, regard their course and add their [adequate] supplement. That is why the way of the humans is pervaded and the way of the kings is comprehended. [...] Therefore, if you can through parallel examples connect kindred cases and through distinguishing investigation add supplements, then you will greatly get the meaning.²¹

These passages of theoretical and methodological reflection always introduce and conclude more lengthy passages of concrete *Chunqiu* exegesis that apply the methodology and explain step by step how this should be done and how the comparison of a case with a kindred case (*lei* 類) can through a conclusive inference (*tui* 推) lead to a valid judgment and even to the induction of general models (*fa* 法). The concrete steps of this comparison are described as, first, going back to the beginning of the case and the original intention of the actors involved, second, from there to look for analogous parallel cases of intention and then, third, transferring the judgment of right and wrong (*shi fei* 是非) of one case to the other.

1. Standards (*fa* 法)

The first thing which appears Mohist in the above passage is the usage of the term *fa* in this investigative context. In his analysis of Mohist epistemology Chris Fraser writes:

Formally, ethical *fa* are not regarded as general principles that we apply as the major premise of a kind of deductive argument, such as a practical syllogism. Rather, they are seen as paradigms or prototypes against which we compare something to distinguish, or *bian*, whether or not it falls under the extension of a term, such as 'yi' (duty, right). Drawing distinctions in this way is the functional equivalent, in Mohist thought, of making a judgment or forming a belief. The ability to draw the distinctions correctly is knowledge. Moreover, the process of citing a *fa*, comparing something to it, and then judging whether the two are similar constitutes the Mohists' basic conception of practical reasoning. Since for the Mohists *fa* include rules as well as models and examples, in their eyes the process of deducing a conclusion from a general rule or principle is in effect a special case of the more general cognitive process of comparing things to models and drawing distinctions. Thus they tend to explain all forms of reasoning, including deductive inference, as species of pattern recognition or analogical reasoning. [...] specifically, being able to distinguish various kinds (*lei*) of things from one another. Propositional knowledge, to the limited extent that it is addressed, is implicitly explained in terms of the ability to distinguish kinds properly.²²

The *Chunqiu fanlu* seems to follow exactly this sort of reasoning by applying Mohist investigative and epistemological methodology to its *Chunqiu* exegesis and using central Mohist notions of ana-

21 Cf. Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 32–33.

22 Cf. Chris Fraser, "Mohism", in "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition)," ed. Edward N. Zalta, online at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/mohism/> (accessed 18.04.09).

lytical operation for its explicative language. The term *fa* is used throughout the early chapters,²³ and there are several passages which explain a methodology similar to the one described above and in Mohist terms:

《春秋》之辭，多所況，是文約而法明也。

The wording²⁴ in the *Chunqiu* allows comparisons to many situations, therefore the text is short yet the standards are clear.²⁵

《春秋》賢而舉之，以為天下法

The *Chunqiu* refers²⁶ to them as worthy and considers them as exemplary models for the whole world.²⁷

得一端而博之，觀其是非，可以得其正法。

If you understand one starting point and relate it widely and then regard its being right and wrong, then you can understand its right standard.²⁸

《春秋》之道，奉天而法古。是故雖有巧手，弗修規矩，不能正方員。雖有察耳，不吹六律，不能定五音。雖有知心，不覽先王，不能平天下。亦天下之規矩六律已。故聖者法天，賢者法聖，此其大數也。得大數而治，失大數而亂，此治亂之分也。

The way of the *Chunqiu* is to revere Heaven and take antiquity as model. That is why even if you have a skilful hand but don't want to apply a compass or a square you are not able to produce a correct square or circle. Even if you have a fine distinguishing ear but you do not play the six measure pipes you are not able to tune the five tones. Even if you have a knowledgeable mind but you do not observe [the way of] the ancient kings you are not able to appease the world. This is thus also the world's compass, square and six measure pipes. Therefore, the sages take Heaven as their model, the able take the sages as their model, this is the great order. If you get the great order the world will be ruled, if you lose it it will be in disorder. This is the separation line of rule and disorder.²⁹

The “Fa yi”, “Tian zhi shang” and “Fei ming zhong” chapters of the *Mozǐ* contain the same argument in similar passages (without the music example, of course)³⁰:

Fa yi 法儀

子墨子曰：「天下從事者不可以無法儀，無法儀而其事能成者無有也。雖至士之為將相者，皆有法，雖至百工從事者，亦皆有法。百工為方以矩，為圓以規，直以繩，正以縣。無巧工不巧工，皆以此五者為法。」

Master Mozi said: “Someone who wants to do something in the world can not be without a standard. There is simply no accomplishment without standards. Even the most sophisticated gentlemen who be-

23 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 6, 12, 14, 15, 24, 31, 32, 40, 48, 52, 62, 88, 94 etc.

24 The technical term 辭 stems from the *Chunqiu* tradition and refers to the highly sophisticated and subtle art of wording by Confucius to convey his wise message. It is not used in a pejorative way like in the Mohist and many other philosophical texts. See Graham, *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science*, 207–209.

25 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 3.

26 Graham (*Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science*, 32) translates the Mohist usage of this technical term (which according to the *Mozǐ* text itself is one out of three technical terms for calling) as “referring”. The *Chunqiu fanlu* frequently uses this term in exactly this meaning.

27 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 6.

28 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 12.

29 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 14.

30 See also Graham's note in *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science*, 225–226.

come generals and ministers all have standards, and even the most skilled craftsmen when they do their work all have a standard as well. If craftsmen produce something square they use a square, if (they produce) something round they use a compass, if (they produce) something straight they use a cord, if (they produce) something vertical they use a perpendicular. Skilled and unskilled craftsmen all take these five instruments as standards.³¹

Tian zhi shang 天志上

子墨子言曰：「我有天志，譬若輪人之有規，匠人之有矩，輪匠執其規矩，以度天下之方圓，曰：『中者是也，不中者非也。』」

Master Mozi said: "Heaven's will is for me what a compass is for a wheelwright and a square for a carpenter. Wheelwright and carpenter use their compass and square to measure the round and the square in the world and they say: 'If it fits it is right, if it doesn't fit it is wrong?'"³²

Fei ming zhong 非命中

雖有巧工，必不能得正焉。

Even if there is a skilled craftsman he will certainly not be able to get it right.³³

This last quote appears to be a short version of what we had in the *Chunqiu fanlu* above. Compare:

| | | |
|----------------------|-------|------------|
| <i>Mozǐ</i> | 雖有巧工， | 必不能得正焉 |
| <i>Chunqiu fanlu</i> | 雖有巧手， | 弗修規矩，不能正方員 |

Another passage shows how the term *fa* was used as part of a technical language of exegesis.

二者同貫，不得不相若也。[...] 故貫比而論，是非雖難悉得，其義一也。[...] 以比言之，法論也，無比而處之，誣辭也。

Since the two [cases] are related through their sameness we cannot but compare them. [...] Therefore, if we discuss them through relating the parallels then, although right and wrong are difficult to obtain, their meaning is one. [...] If you interpret it on the basis of parallel cases, this is a discussion based on exemplary models. If you judge it without parallel cases, these are slanderous statements.³⁴

This "discussion based on exemplary models" (*falun* 法論) becomes part of the exegetical terminology of the *Chunqiu fanlu*. The expression *Chunqiu zhi fa* 《春秋》之法, "the exemplary models of the *Chunqiu*", appears frequently as a standard exegetical formulation.³⁵ In another passage we read: *you fa lun zhi* 由法論之, "if you discuss this on the basis of exemplary models..."³⁶

In the three chapters "Rejecting Fatalism (*fei ming*)" of the *Mozǐ* we find three slightly different definitions of three standards (*san fa* 三法) or evidences (*san biao* 三表) of speech (*yan* 言) which run as follows: any statement must 1. be rooted (*ben* 本) or be proven (*kao* 考) in the will of Heaven and the ghosts and in the teachings and deeds of the ancient kings. It must 2. originate

31 Cf. Wu Yujiang 吳毓江, *Mozǐ jiaozhu* 墨子校注 (Chengdu: Xinan shifan daxue, 1992), 25. Wu has listed another instrument between cord and perpendicular: *beng yi shui* 衡以水, "if something horizontal they use water." I have dropped that in comparison with other editions and the text internal logic.

32 Cf. Wu Yujiang, *Mozǐ jiaozhu*, 255.

33 Cf. Wu Yujiang, *Mozǐ jiaozhu*, 349.

34 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 40.

35 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 31, 48, 52, 88, 94 etc.

36 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 62.

(*yuan* 原) in the real empirical experience of the people (seen by oneself [*jian* 見] or heard from others [*wen* 聞]) or reliable stories told in ancient books. And it must 3. have a positive effect when applied (*yong* 用) to government.³⁷

The *Chunqiu* exegesis also follows this scheme. The *Chunqiu fanlu* emphasizes that the standard models of the *Chunqiu* are in accord with the way of Heaven and of the ancient kings. That they have been experienced is self-evident through the empirical reality of the historical material which is taken as a reliable narrative from an ancient book that, according to the *Gongyang zhu*an (Ai 14.1), can be divided into three stages of transmission: seen by oneself (*jian* 見), heard from others (*wen* 聞) or transmitted by third parties/media (*chuan wen* 傳聞). And the exegesis time and again emphasizes the consequences of the application of particular standards which prove their being right or wrong (*shi fei*). The *Mozzi* which argues throughout its chapters on the basis of its interpretations of historical material (which is part of the first or the second *fa*) and the historiographical tradition of the *Chunqiu* seem to operate in identical ways, and it is hard for us to decide which tradition has in fact invented this methodology.

2. Inference (*tui* 推)

Probably taken over from the Sophist and Mohist schools the *Chunqiu fanlu* uses several technical terms to refer to the logical operation of inference which as an exegetical concept existed already in the *Gongyang zhu*an.³⁸ We find the expressions *tui er qian zhi, yi yi yue* 推而前之, 亦宜曰, “inferring from it and putting it forward, it is also appropriate to say...”³⁹ and: *yin er hou zhi, yi yi yue* 引而後之, 亦宜曰 “inducing from it and pulling it behind, it is also appropriate to say...”⁴⁰ These two formulations are set in a clear parallelist mode, and it is evident how the language, although using technical terms from the logical traditions such as *tui*, is still open for the playfulness of a good parallelist style. In other passages we read: *tui er san zhi* 推而散之 “infer from it and apply it broadly”⁴¹, or:

是故為《春秋》者，得一端而多連之，見一空而博貫之，則天下盡矣。

Therefore, the one who made the *Chunqiu* when he got one point he connected it manifold, when he saw one lacuna (in which something was meaningfully left out in the text) he widely related it, and thus the world was fully explored.⁴²

And, following up on that the following passage concludes:

以魯人之若是也，亦知他國之皆若是也。以他國之皆若是，亦知天下之皆若是也。此之謂連而貫之。故天下雖大，古今雖久，以是定矣。

From the fact that for the people from Lu it was like that we can also know that for all the other states it was like that. And from the fact that for all the other states it was like that we can also know that for the

37 Cf. the beginnings of the three “Fei ming” chapters.

38 Cf. *Gongyang zhu*an, Duke Wen 9.1. For the Mohist concept of *tui* see Graham, *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science*, 482–485, 487–489. We find the appropriation of this Mohist concept already in the *Mengzi*, cf. David S. Nivinson, *The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy*, (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1996), 96–97, 101, 137.

39 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 27.

40 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 28.

41 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 72.

42 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 97.

whole world it was like that. That is meant by connecting and relating it. Therefore, although the world is vast and although the time period from antiquity to today is long, it is proven by this.⁴³

3. Right and wrong (*shi fei* 是非)

In chapter two the function and role of the Five Classics is described in terms entirely absent in the earlier *Gongyang* tradition (*zhi* 志, *zhi-wen* 質文, *de* 德, *gong* 功, *shi-fei* 是非) but very prominent in Mohism:

六學皆大，而各有所長。《詩》道志，故長於質。《禮》製節，故長於文。《樂》詠德，故長於風。《書》著功，故長於事。《易》本天地，故長於數。《春秋》正是非，故長於治人。

The teaching of all the Six [Classics] is great, yet each has its strength: The *Shi* expresses intentions and is therefore strong in simplicity. The *Li* sets up divisions and is therefore strong in refinement. The *Yue* praises moral power and is therefore strong in ballads. The *Shu* reveals achievements and is therefore strong in state affairs. The *Yi* is rooted in Heaven and Earth and is therefore strong in Heavenly proportions. The *Chunqiu* rectifies right and wrong and is therefore strong in ruling people.⁴⁴

The role of the *Chunqiu* is defined as rectifying right and wrong (*shi fei*), it appears thus as the most “logical” of all the classics. Another passage links the right and wrong further to the *fa*-standards:

《春秋》，義之大者也。得一端而博之，觀其是非，可以得其正法。

The *Chunqiu* is great in righteousness. If you get one point, broadly apply it and regard its being right and wrong then you can obtain its right standard.⁴⁵

Accordingly, right and wrong appear time and again in the exegetical reflections. In the *Gongyang zhuan shi* and *fei* do not appear as technical terms. Instead it uses the terms *li* 禮 (according to ritual rules) and *fei li* 非禮 (not according to ritual rules). In the light of the Mohist critique against Confucian ritual this terminology seems to have been changed into the Mohist terms of *shi* and *fei* which can be regarded as direct translations of *li* and *fei li* since they denote exactly the same issues. Once again, the *Chunqiu* exegesis is transferred into the new framework of Mohist logical terminology which continues earlier exegetical analysis but inserts it into a new programme of logical necessity:

是非難別者在此。此其嫌疑相似而不同理者，不可不察。

Here lies the difficulty of distinguishing right and wrong. And therefore the suspicion and doubt that it arises in regard to the similarity that yet follows a different pattern, has to be investigated here.⁴⁶

This urgency of analytical investigation is also part of the Mohist rhetoric. The formulation that something necessarily needs to be investigated (*bu ke bu cha* 不可不察) appears frequently in both, the *Chunqiu fanlu* and the *Mozǐ*.

43 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 98. The formulation: “*yi A mo shi yi zhi B mo shi*” 以A若是，亦知B若是 is taken from the *Gongyang zhuan* (most prominently in Duke Wen 9.1, in Duke Xi 20.2 this formulation appears in a quote of the, amongst all seven *Gongyang* masters most frequently quoted, *Gongyang* master Luzi 魯子 and thus belongs to the earliest exegetical layer of the *Gongyang zhuan*).

44 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 35–36.

45 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 12.

46 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 59.

4. Intention (*zhi* 志)

The *Chunqiu fanlu* emphasizes that the *Chunqiu* esteems intention. The term *zhi* 志 (intention) does not appear even once in the *Gongyang zhuàn*.⁴⁷ In the *Chunqiu fanlu* it plays a central explanatory role and is often involved in basic statements about the *Chunqiu* and its exegetic methodology:

《春秋》之論事，莫重於志。

In discussing affairs nothing is more important to the *Chunqiu* than the intentions.⁴⁸

《春秋》之好微與其貴志也。《春秋》修本末之義，達變故之應，通生死之志，遂人道之極者也。

The *Chunqiu* likes subtle formulations because it esteems intention. In setting up a righteousness which lies in the differentiation of important and unimportant, in imbuing the resonances of the causes of changes and in penetrating the intents aiming at life and death the *Chunqiu* follows the utmost of the human way.⁴⁹

《春秋》之聽獄也，必本其事而原其志。

In judging cases the *Chunqiu* always seeks the root of the affairs and the origin of the involved intentions.⁵⁰

It is significant that the two verbs which describe the *Chunqiu* exegetical methodology here, *ben* 本 and *yuan* 原, are exactly those which Mozi uses in his three standards (*san fa*) of speech at the beginning of the “Fei ming” chapters. The Mohist concept of application (*yong* 用) is implied in the judging of cases.

In the following passage the intention is taken to explain why and how ritual and music can still be relevant (even within a Mohist context).

禮之所重者在其志。志敬而節具，則君子予之知禮。志和而音雅，則君子予之知樂。志哀而居約，則君子予之知喪。

The importance of ritual lies at its intentions. If the intentions are respectful and the formal distinctions are therefore complete then the Master would grant this to be knowledgeable of rituals. If the intention is harmonious and the musical form is therefore elegant then the Master would grant this to be knowledgeable of music. If the intention is full of grief and the formal setting is therefore austere then the Master would grant this to be knowledgeable of mourning.⁵¹

At the beginning of the “Xiu shen” chapter of the *Mozi* we read:

喪雖有禮，而哀為本焉

Although mourning includes rites, grief still provides the basis of it.⁵²

This seems to formulate a very similar point, although, again, music is not mentioned here.

5. Names and reality (*ming shi* 名實)

In their *Chunqiu* exegesis several passages of the *Chunqiu fanlu* make analytical use of the distinction between names and reality and explain *Chunqiu* judgments through pointing out that there is a

47 See, for an interpretation, Gentz, *Gongyang zhuàn*, 310–311.

48 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 25.

49 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 38.

50 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 92.

51 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 27.

52 Wu Yujang, *Mozi jiaozhu*, 9.

difference between a ritual form and the reality this form relates to. In chapter one the analytical pair *ming* 名 – *shi* 實 is taken to explain that a new dynasty needs to change institutions (*gai zhi* 改制, institutions referring to colours, music, rituals, names [*ming* 名] etc.) without changing the right way of the ancient kings (as reality: *shi* 實).⁵³ In chapter two, *ming* and *shi* are used to explain why a particular behaviour of one of the historical actors can formally be criticised by the *Chunqiu* through its wording (by naming [*ming*] it ‘regicide’) although in reality (*shi*) he is exempted from guilt.⁵⁴ This seems to be another way to translate typical basic ritual issues such as the relation of intention and form into the language of Mohist logic.

Whereas the exegesis in the first five chapters focuses on this sort of highly developed hermeneutics applied to individual passages, it becomes much more oriented toward specific topics in chapters 6 through 9, which lead to the purely topic-oriented chapters 10–12 of which chapter 12 is the culmination.

Chunqiu Fanlu Chapter 12

In chapter 12 ten guiding points⁵⁵ (*shi zhi* 十指) for the reading of the *Chunqiu* are listed. As mentioned above, the new and central question in this chapter is not, like in the earlier chapters, whether these guiding points may be found in the *Chunqiu* but rather whether *these* are the central and most important guiding points or not. Since the ten guiding points have a strong Mohist tinge this question has to be understood as a negotiation of the Mohist position in the strong Confucian domain of *Chunqiu* exegesis. Chapter 17 as the postface of the *Chunqiu* exegetical chapters of the *Chunqiu fanlu* refutes this position and asserts and affirms the Confucian position with the concession of giving love (*ai* 愛) a central position. The ten points run as follows:

十指

《春秋》二百四十二年之文，天下之大，事變之博，無不有也。雖然，大略之要有十指。十指者，事之所擊也，王化之所由得流也。舉事變見有重焉，一指也。見事變之所至者，一指也。因其所以至者而治之，一指也。強干弱枝，大本小末，一指也。別嫌疑，異同類，一指也。論賢才之義，別所長之能，一指也。親近來遠，同民所欲，一指也。承周文而反之質，一指也。木生火，火為夏，天之端，一指也。切刺讖之所罰，考變異之所加，天之端，一指也。舉事變見有重焉，則百姓安矣。見事變之所至者，則得失審矣。因其所以至而治之，則事之本正矣。強干弱枝，大本小末，則君臣之分明矣。別嫌疑，異同類，則是非著矣。論賢才之義，別所長之能，則百官序矣。承周文而反之質，則化所務立矣。親近來遠，同民所欲，則仁恩達矣。木生火，火為夏，則陰陽四時之理相受而次矣。切刺讖之所罰，考變異之所加，則天所欲為行矣。統此而舉之，德澤廣大，衍溢於四海，陰陽和調，萬物靡不得其理矣。說《春秋》者凡用是矣，此其法也。

53 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 17–19.

54 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 41.

55 Graham (in *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science*, 33) notes the literary translation of *zhi* 指 as “pointings” for the Mohist context and refers to Gongsun Long who uses this term as technical term, especially in his “Zhi wu lun” 指物論 chapter. At the same time the ten *zhi* as “ten fingers” also allude to the completeness of this list. Bodde (Feng Youlan, *History of Chinese Philosophy*, transl. Derk Bodde, Princeton: Princeton University, 1952–1953, vol. 1, 209ff.) translates *zhi* as “universals,” and is criticised for it by Graham.

Ten guiding points⁵⁶

In the text of the *Chunqiu* which covers 242 years none of the great events in the world and nothing of the multitude of the changes of affairs is not contained. Nevertheless, as an essence of the main lines there are ten guiding points. These guiding points are what the affairs of the *Chunqiu* are related to and from where the kingly cultivation can spread. A [first] guiding point is that the changes of the affairs are highlighted and the important issues are pointed out. A [second] guiding point is that the point up to which the changes of the affairs can reach is shown. A [third] guiding point is that they are regulated according to that which caused them to reach up to that point. A [fourth] guiding point is that the trunk is strengthened and the branches are weakened, the roots are enhanced and the branches are reduced. A [fifth] guiding point is that ambiguities and doubts [in regard to the judgment of right and wrong] are eliminated by distinguishing the same kinds [of cases from others, and the judgments of right and wrong can thus be applied]. A [sixth] guiding point is that the righteousness of able and talented people is judged and their abilities are differentiated. A [seventh] guiding point is that those living near by are treated as intimate and those living far away are thereby induced to come, further that decisions are made in accordance with the desires of the people. An [eighth] guiding point is that the refined culture of the Zhou is continued and is returned to the simple. A [ninth] guiding point is that the phase wood produces fire and that fire correlates to summer, and this is accepted as a Heavenly starting point. A [tenth] guiding point is that what is criticised [in the *Chunqiu*] is analysed and what is expressed through the abnormalities and calamities is investigated and this is understood as Heavenly prodigies.

If the changes of the affairs are highlighted and the important issues are pointed out then the hundred families are in peace. If the point up to which the changes of the affairs can reach is shown then success and failure become clear. If they are regulated according to that which caused them to reach up to that point then the roots of the affairs are rectified. If the trunk is strengthened and the branches are weakened, the roots are enhanced and the branches are reduced, then the difference between ruler and ministers will be obvious. If ambiguities and doubts [in regard to the judgment of right and wrong] are eliminated by distinguishing the same kinds [of cases from others and the judgments of right and wrong can thus be applied] then judgments about right and wrong are definite. If the righteousness of able and talented people is judged and their abilities are differentiated, then all the officials will get their right position. If those living near by are treated as intimate and those living far away are thereby induced to come, further if decisions are made in accordance with the desires of the people, then humanity and kindness will be achieved. If the refined culture of the Zhou is continued and is returned to the simple then what constitutes the cultivation in the state will be set up. If the phase wood produces fire, and fire correlates to summer, then the patterns of *yin* and *yang* and the four seasons will be in balance and follow in order upon each other. If what is criticised [in the *Chunqiu*] is analysed and what is expressed through the abnormalities and calamities is investigated, then what Heaven desires is put into action. By its knitting together and exemplification of these things, it causes humanity and righteousness to circulate, and moral power will unfold and spread widely throughout the four seas. *Yin* and *yang* will then be in a harmonious relation, and among the uncountable things none will not be in order. Those who interpret the *Chunqiu* should always use these [ten guiding points] because these are its standards.⁵⁷

The text thus declares the ten guiding points to be *fa*-standards. The first three guiding points are methodological ones and refer again to the following threefold method of investigation which is

56 For a fully annotated translation and analysis in the light of the chapters 10 and 11 see Gentz, *Gongyang zhuan*, 469–497. For other English translations see Feng Youlan, *History of Chinese Philosophy*, vol. 2, 76, and Benjamin Elman, *Classicism, Politics, and Kinship: The Ch'ang-chou School of New Text Confucianism in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley: University of California, 1990), 174.

57 Su Yu, *Chunqiu fanlu yizheng*, 144–147.

closely associated with the concept of the intention: identify the event, explain its cause, and regulate it accordingly. The following points refer to central Mohist themes: distinguish same kinds (*tong lei* 同類), focus on the ability of the people, act in accordance with the people's desires, prefer the simple against the refined of the Zhou, pay attention to Heavenly starting points and its punishments as reflection of its will. Some of the consequences in the second part also reflect Mohist thought: the oppositional pair "success and failure" (*de* 得 – *shi* 失), as it occurs frequently in the *Chunqiu fanlu*, translates the Mohist pair "benefit (*li* 利) and harm (*hai* 害)", and we find again *shi* and *fei* as a result of distinguishing the same kinds. The only thing not Mohist here is the reference to the cosmological systems of *yin* and *yang* and the five phases (*wuxing*) to which the Mohists fundamentally objected.⁵⁸ Everything else is very much in line with basic Mohist values, terms and analytical approaches, much more than with the *Gongyang zhuàn*. The new exegesis differs from the *Gongyang zhuàn* mainly in its epistemological assumptions. Han commentators who apply cosmological principles to their textual interpretations show much more self-confidence with regard to their own ability to gain insight into the relevant meaning of the texts. Since the language of Heaven is discovered as a further source to prove right and wrong, the textual sources can be explained in the light and in accordance with that further conceivable voice of truth. This sounds very Mohist in the sense of the "Tian zhi" chapter in which the will of Heaven clearly stands above not only of parents and rulers but also of ancient books and wise kings. This appeared quite attractive to Han Confucians. The business of governance, patterns of behaviour, and even dynastic legitimation in Early Han became increasingly grounded in Heavenly omnia as expressions of Heaven's will and cosmological patterns rather than in transmitted rules of wise kings of the past. Accordingly, patterns of exegetical reasoning also changed. Instead of explanations focusing on the structure of the text, the social background of the author, on transmitted glosses, sayings, or narratives, or on parallel expressions or passages of other classical texts, the canonical texts are now further analyzed by use of a new technical terminology according to cosmological patterns detected in them and their accordance with the will of Heaven.

Conclusion

Mohist traces can be detected all over the early chapters of the *Chunqiu fanlu*. We have been able to identify central topics, concepts, terms and methodologies of the Mohist tradition that do not occur in the *Gongyang zhuàn*. To call them Mohist, however, involves the assumption that something like a Mohist identity still existed in Early Han. This in turn provokes the question of how much of the earlier Zhou-Ruist identities may have possibly constituted Han-Confucianism. If we assert that most of the innovations in the *Chunqiu fanlu* take their origin in the earlier Mohist traditions, we need to go one step further and touch upon the more basic systematic question, namely which Ruist elements assure the Ruist character of Early Han-Confucianism (which is still called *ru*). If we want to assert the identity of Mohist elements we need to assure that their meaning is still part of something like a coherent Mohist ideology or system of thought. Such a thing, however, had ceased to exist in Early Han times. The traces of Mohism in the new reference system of Han-Confucianism thus seem to have become part of a new Confucian reality and to have lost their Mohist name.

58 Cf. Graham, *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science*, 55.